2010.5.15    高雄律師-楊岡儒律師

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關於受教權（教育權；Right to Education），其主要範疇在於學生之教育權益（Students’ Right to Education）之保障，然而學校之整體事務，仍應包含學校機關之獨立運作及教職員工之職能暨其權益保障等範疇，並涉及公益維護之社會功能機制，所以大法官釋字659號解釋文及理由書中即接櫫：『教育乃國家百年大計，影響深遠，具高度之公共性及強烈之公益性』、『基於維護(私立)學校之健全發展，保障學生之受教權利及教職員之工作權益等重要公益』等重要理念；至於教育平等（Education Equality）之保障，雖無法從本號解釋即得明文觀察，然而如就其所涉爭議以觀，例如本案之該私校董事會爭議，依法得授權主管教育行政機關及時介入監督，關於此監督機制，所稱之『學校之健全發展』，即涉及受教權及廣泛教育平等之概念，因此筆者仍將該內涵列入，尚請方家多予見諒。

以下謹然援引其解釋之重要內容，並請大家參考。

並期盼，我們應多重視教育之健全功能及維護學生權益之保障。

祝福大家安好與順心如意

兔寶寶律師  謹筆

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大法官會議解釋：大法官釋字659號

解釋文：    

中華民國八十六年六月十八日修正公布之私立學校法第三十二條第一項規定：「董事會因發生糾紛，致無法召開會議或有違反教育法令情事者，主管教育行政機關得限期命其整頓改善；逾期不為整頓改善或整頓改善無效果時，得解除全體董事之職務。但其情節重大且情勢急迫時，主管教育行政機關得經私立學校諮詢委員會決議解除全體董事之職務或停止其職務二個月至六個月，必要時得延長之。」關於董事會因發生糾紛，致無法召開會議或有違反教育法令情事部分，其意義依法條文義及立法目的，非受規範之董事難以理解，並可經由司法審查加以確認，與法律明確性原則尚無違背。上開但書規定，旨在維護私立學校之健全發展，保障學生之受教權利及教職員之工作權益等重要公益，目的洵屬正當，所採取之限制手段，乃為達成目的所必要，並未牴觸憲法第二十三條之比例原則，與憲法保障人民工作權之意旨尚無違背。

大法官釋字659號理由書(節錄)：

教育乃國家百年大計，影響深遠，具高度之公共性及強烈之公益性。憲法第一百六十二條規定，全國公私立之教育文化機關，依法律受國家監督。舊私立學校法即係為實現上開憲法意旨所制定之法律。舊私立學校法第三十二條第一項規定：「董事會因發生糾紛，致無法召開會議或有違反教育法令情事者，主管教育行政機關得限期命其整頓改善；逾期不為整頓改善或整頓改善無效果時，得解除全體董事之職務。但其情節重大且情勢急迫時，主管教育行政機關得經私立學校諮詢委員會決議解除全體董事之職務或停止其職務二個月至六個月，必要時得延長之。」（下稱系爭規定）其中關於解除全體董事之職務，係對於選擇職業自由所為之主觀條件限制（本院釋字第六三七號、第六四九號解釋參照），國家欲加以限制，必須基於追求重要公益目的，且所採手段與目的之達成須有實質關聯。系爭規定於董事會因發生糾紛致無法召開會議，或有違反教育法令情事，或其情節重大且情勢急迫時，授權主管教育行政機關及時介入監督，旨在維護私立學校之健全發展，保障學生之受教權利及教職員之工作權益等重要公益，符合上開憲法基本國策之規範意旨，其目的洵屬正當。

依本院歷來解釋，法律規定所使用之概念，其意義依法條文義及立法目的，如非受規範者難以理解，並可經由司法審查加以確認，即與法律明確性原則無違（本院釋字第四三二號、第四九一號、第六○二號及第六三六號解釋參照）。系爭規定關於董事會因發生糾紛致無法召開會議，乃以董事會因糾紛導致無法召開會議為已足，並不問其糾紛之發生是否可歸責於個別董事會成員。而董事會議每學期至少舉行一次；董事會議由董事長召集，或經現任董事三分之一以上，以書面提出會議目的及召集理由，請求召集董事會議時，董事長須自受請求之日起十日內召集之（舊私立學校法第二十七條第一項、第二項前段、第三項前段參照）；董事會之決議，應有過半數董事之出席；但重要事項之決議，應有三分之二以上董事之出席（第二十九條第二項參照）。故所謂無法召開會議，乃指無法依舊私立學校法上開規定召開會議而言。關於董事會違反教育法令情事部分，以各該教育法令明確存在為前提，其範圍應屬可得確定，對於此一規定之內涵，並無受規範之董事難以理解之處。又苟認董事會有違反教育法令情事，須以董事會發生糾紛為必要，則在董事會成員全體一致決議造成董事會有違反教育法令情事，致學生及教師權益受損之情形下，主管機關卻無法加以監督命其改善，自非系爭規定立法之本意。是私立學校董事會如有「董事會因發生糾紛，致無法召開會議」或「董事會有違反教育法令情事」之一者，即合主管教育行政機關行使其監督權之要件，系爭規定依法條文義及立法目的，非受規範之董事難以理解，且為其所得預見，並可經由司法審查加以確認，與法律明確性原則尚無違背。

J. Y. Interpretation No.591

Holding：

Article 32, Paragraph 1 of the Private School Act, as amended and promulgated on June 18, 1997, provides: “ if a board of directors cannot convene its meeting(s) as a result of dispute, or is in violation of education laws and regulations, the government agency in charge of the education (hereinafter referred to as the “Authority”) may order the school to take steps to improve the situation by a specified date and shall the board fail to comply, the Authority may then remove all of the board members from office. Nevertheless, in the event severe circumstances and urgent situation arise, the Authority may, after consulting the Private School Consultative Committee (the “Committee”) to obtain a resolution from the Committee, forthwith remove all of the board members from office or suspend all of their powers for two to six months with the possibility to extend if necessary.” With respect to the paragraph “if a board of directors cannot convene its meeting(s) as a result of dispute, or is in violation of education laws and regulations”, while its literal meaning and legislative purpose may not be incomprehensible to those directors who are subject to the law, it can be scrutinized and defined through judicial review, and there should be no violation of the principle of clarity and definiteness of the law.

The proviso stipulated in the Article is aimed to maintain the sound development of private schools, and to protect students’ right to education as well as faculty and working staff’s right to work, among other important interests. Such objectives are justified and the restrictive means taken are necessary to accomplish the goals and, therefore not inconsistent with the principle of proportionality under Article 23 of the Constitution, nor in conflict with the people’s right to work guaranteed by the Constitution.

Reasoning（excerpts）：

With a high degree of public interest and welfare, education is State’s long-term project and its effect is far-reaching. Article 162 of the Constitution provides that all public and private educational and cultural institutions in the nation shall be subject to State supervision in accordance with the law. The Old Act was thus enacted to realize the meaning and purpose of this Constitution provision. Article 32, Paragraph 1 of the Old Act provides that: “if a board of directors cannot convene its meeting(s) as a result of a dispute, or is in violation of education laws and regulations, the Authority may order the school to take steps to improve the situation by a specified date and shall the board fail to comply, the Authority may then remove all of the board members from office. Nevertheless, in the event severe circumstances and urgent situation arise, the Authority may, after consulting the Private School Consultative Committee to obtain a resolution, forthwith remove all of the board members from office or suspend all of their powers for two to six months with the possibility to extend if necessary” (hereinafter referred to as the “disputed provision”). Removing all of the directors from office is a restriction on their subjective condition concerning the freedom to choose an occupation (see J.Y. Interpretations Nos. 637 and 649). The State, wishing to do so, must be for the purpose of pursuing an important public interest and the means taken shall be substantially related to attainment of its purpose. The disputed provision stipulates that if a board meeting can not be convened due to a dispute, or if the board has violated education laws and regulations, the Authority is then authorized to timely intervene to maintain the sound development of private schools, and to protect students’ rights to education as well as faculty and working staff’s rights to work, among other important interests. It is in line with the meaning and purpose of Constitution’s fundamental national policy and is thus justified and appropriate.Pursuant to this Yuan’s past Interpretations, the concepts used in a statute are not inconsistent with the principle of clarity and definiteness of the law if their meanings, through the statute’s text and legislative purpose, are not incomprehensible to those who are subject to the statute, and may also be scrutinized and defined through judicial review (see Interpretations 432, 491, 602 and 632). With respect to board meetings that can not be convened as stipulated in the disputed provision, it is sufficient so long as it is the result of a dispute, regardless of whether the dispute is attributable to any individual board member’s fault. Given that the board shall convene at least once every semester to be called by the chairman of the board, or to convene within 10 days after the chairman receives a written request of more than 1/3 of the incumbent directors that states the purpose and reasons of the meeting (see Paragraph 1, first part of Paragraph 2 and first part of Paragraph 3 of Article 27 of the Old Act) and that a board resolution requires a quorum of more than 1/2 of the directors, or more than 2/3 of the directors for material matters (see Article 29, Paragraph 2), the so-called “cannot convene its meetings” refers to the above-cited provisions under the Old Act.

With regard to the part that concerns whether the board of directors violates education laws and regulations, it is premised on the fact that the relevant education laws and regulations are clear and definite in text, that their scope can be ascertained and their contents are not incomprehensible to the directors who are subject to the law.Furthermore, it cannot be the legislative intent of the disputed provision to assume that a board of directors is deemed to have violated education laws and regulations and is still considered necessary that it should first have a dispute; otherwise even when the board unanimously passes an illegal resolution that damages the rights of students and faculty, the Authority would still lack the authority to supervise private schools and have them take remedy measures.

Consequently, the Authority can exercise its supervision power so long as the board of directors of private schools either “cannot convene its board meeting(s) as a result of a dispute” or “has violated education regulations”. If the disputed provision, through its text and legislative purpose, is not incomprehensible to the directors who are subject to the disputed provision and can be foreseeable by them, and may also be scrutinized and defined through judicial review, it is not in conflict with the principle of clarity and definiteness of the law.